With decentralized cryptocurrencies, an increasingly important problem is how to design communicationefficient Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols: in this paper, communication efficiency means that the number of pairwise messages necessary for reaching agreement is subquadratic in the total number of players n (or alternatively, only sublinear number of nodes need to multicast messages to all other nodes). A few existing works have shown how to achieve subquadratic BA under an adaptive adversary, including the breakthrough result by King and Saia (PODC'10), the celebrated Nakamoto consensus protocol, and a few proof-of-stake protocols such as Algorand.
Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) [3, 13, 14, 25 ] is a central abstraction in distributed systems. Roughly speaking, in (binary) BA, every player receives an input bit that is either 0 or 1. The players' goal is to agree on a bit such that the following properties are satisfied over all but a negligible (in some security parameter κ) fraction of executions: 1) consistency/safety: all honest players output the same bit, 2) validity: if all honest nodes receive the same input bit b, then all honest nodes output b.
Typical BA protocols [7, 13, 14] require all players to send messages to all other players, and thus, n-player BA requires at least n 2 communication complexity. Such protocol are thus not well suited for large-scale distributed systems (e.g., decentralized cryptocurrencies). A fundamental problem is to design BA protocols with improved communication complexity. In a model with static corruption, this is relatively easy: for example, if there is a trusted common random string (CRS) that is chosen independently of the adversary's corruption choices, we can use the CRS to select a small, poly log κ-sized committee of players, and then run any BA protocol among the committee (recall that κ is the security parameter). Finally the committee members may send their outputs to all other "non-committee" players who could then output the majority bit. Various elegant works have investigated how to weaken or remove the trusted set-up assumptions required for such a committee election and still retain small bandwidth [8, 22, 23] .
Such a committee-based approach, however, fails if we consider an adaptive attacker. Such an attacker can simply observe what nodes are on the committee, then corrupt them, and thereby control the whole committee! A natural and long-standing open question is thus whether subquadratic communication is possible w.r.t. an adaptive attacker:
Does there exist a BA protocol with subquadratic communication complexity that resists adaptive corruption of players?
This question has been partially answered in a few prior works [9, 11, 17, 22, 28] . First, in 2010, a breakthrough work by King and Saia [22] presented a BA protocol with communication complexity O(n 1.5 ). More recent works studied practical constructions motivated by cryptocurrency applications: notably the celebrated Nakamoto consensus [17, 28] can reach agreement in n · poly log κ amount of communication assuming idealized proof-of-work. Subsequently several so-called "proof-of-stake" constructions [9, 11] in essence also showed how to realize BA with n · poly log κ communication in the PKI model. All of the above works can tolerate 1/3 to 1/2 fraction of adaptively corrupted nodes.
What is both intriguing and unsatisfying is that all these works happen to make a common relaxing assumption about the adaptivity of the adversary, namely, if adversary adaptively corrupts an honest node i who has just sent a message m in round r, the adversary is unable to erase the honest message m sent in round r. Henceforth we say that such an adversary is incapable of after-the-fact removal. In comparison, many natural Ω(n 2 )-communication BA protocols [1, 13, 21] can be proven secure w.r.t. a strongly adaptive adversary capable of after-the-fact removal. That is, if an honest node i sends a message m in round r, the adversary (e.g., who controls the egress routers of many nodes) can observe m and then decide to corrupt i and erase the message m that node i has just sent in round r. This mismatch in model naturally raises the following question:
Is disallowing after-the-fact removal necessary for achieving subquadratic-communication BA?
Main result 1: disallowing "after-the-fact" removal is necessary. Our first contribution is a new lower bound showing that any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must incur at least Ω(f 2 ) communication in the presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact removal where f < n denotes the number of corrupt nodes.
The proof of our lower bound is inspired by the work of Dolev and Reischuk [12] , who showed that any deterministic BA protocol must incur Ω(f 2 ) communication even against a static adversary. Their lower bound fails for randomized protocols. We show a similar communication complexity lower bound for randomized protocols, but now additionally assuming that the adversary is strongly adaptive and can perform after-the-fact removals. We remark our lower bound (as well as Dolev-Reischuk) holds in a very strong sense: even when making common (possibly very strong) setup assumptions such as the existence of (even proof-of-work) random oracles and even under a more constrained omission adversary who is only allowed to omit messages sent from and to corrupt nodes, but does not deviate from the protocol otherwise.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility of BA with subquadratic communication w.r.t. a strongly adaptive adversary). Any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must in expectation incur at least Ω(f 2 ) communication in the presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact removal, where f < n denotes the number of corrupt nodes.
Main result 2: near-optimal subquadratic BA with minimal assumptions. On the upper bound front, we present subquadratic BA protocols that, besides the necessary "no after-the-fact removal" assumption, rely only on standard cryptographic and setup assumptions. Furthermore, our protocol achieves:
• Near-optimal resilience i.e., resisting at most 1/2 fraction of corrupt nodes in a synchronous network 1 , and
• Expected constant round.
Our results improve existing works in two major aspects. First, besides "no after-the-fact removal", all existing works [9, 11, 22 , 28] make very strong additional assumptions. Nakamoto consensus [17, 28] assumes idealized proofs-of-work. Some works assume random oracles [9, 11] . Other works [9, 22] assume the ability of honest nodes to securely erase secrets from memory and that adaptive corruption cannot take place in a round between when an honest node sends a message and when it erases secrets from memory. Such a model is commonly referred to in the cryptography literature as the "erasure model" and as "ephemeral keys" in Chen and Micali [9] . 2 In this paper, to avoid confusing the term with "after-the-fact message removal", we rename it the memory-erasure model
More importantly, even with the above strong assumptions, no prior work can simultaneously achieve the above properties. Nakamoto style protocols, either proof-of-work [28] or proof-of-stake-based [11] , cannot achieve expected constant round. King-Saia [22] and Chen-Micali [9] protocols have sub-optimal tolerate of f < ( Main result 3: on the necessasity of the PKI. In light of the above Theorem 2, we additionally investigate whether the remaining PKI assumption is necessary. We show that if one insists on a multicast-based protocol, indeed this assumption (or some form of setup assumption) is necessary for achieving sublinear multicast complexity. Specifically, we show that without any setup assumption, i.e., under the plain authenticated channels model, no (possibly randomized) BA protocol with C multicast communication complexity can tolerate more than C weakly adaptive corruptions.
Theorem 3 (Impossibility of sublinear multicast BA without setup assumptions). In a plain authenticated channels model without a PKI, no protocol with C(κ, n) multicast complexity can achieve BA under C(κ, n) adaptive corruptions, assuming that the total number of nodes n = poly(κ) is a sufficiently large polynomial. Further, the lower bound holds even assuming fully synchronous communication, the existence of a random oracle or a common reference string, and even in the memory-erasure model.
Summarizing our lower-bound and upper-bound results above, we believe that our work makes a significant step forward in understanding what minimal assumptions might be necessary in achieving subquadraticcommunication BA.
Terminology, Disambuiguation, and Additional Related Work
Protocol execution model. Throughout the paper, we assume that protocols execute in a standard Interactive Turing Machine (ITM) model, where honest nodes receive inputs from an environment denoted Z(1 κ ) and sends their outputs to Z as well. An adversary A(1 κ ) may observe what messages honest nodes want to send in a round, and then adaptively corrupt nodes during this round. Although the adversary cannot erase a message that was already sent in this round before a node i became corrupt in the same round, it can make i send additional messages in this round once i is corrupt. A and Z can communicate arbitrarily at any time during the execution. All corrupt nodes are under the control of A, i.e., A can decide what messages they should send. We assume that A and Z are non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time (p.p.t.) Turing Machines and the protocol definition (i.e., honest nodes) can also be probabilistic. Throughout the paper, we would like all but a negligible in κ fraction of executions to satisfy the desired security properties. We defer a more formal description of the execution model to Appendix A.1.
Agreement vs. Broadcast. Byzantine Agreement is typically studied in two forms (see Appendix A for formal definitions):
• Agreement version: every node receives an input bit, and they seek to reach consensus on a bit such that such that except with negligible probability, if all honest nodes receive the same input bit b, then all honest nodes must output b too.
• Broadcast version (also called Byzantine Broadcast): a designated sender aims to propagate a bit to all other nodes; such that except with negligible probability, all honest nodes must output the same bit; and moreover if the designated sender is forever-honest (i.e., honest throughout the protocol's execution), any honest output must be equal to the sender's input bit. Under the honest-majority assumption, the two notions are equivalent from a feasibility perspective, i.e., we can construct one from the other (but possibly incur polynomial blowup in communication complexity). Moreover, at least one direction of the reduction preserves communication efficiency. Specifically, given an adaptively secure BA protocol (agreement version), one can construct an adaptively secure Byzantine Broadcast protocol by first having the designated sender multicasting its input to everyone, and then having everyone invoke the BA instance. In this way, if the BA scheme is communication efficient, so is the resulting Byzantine Broadcast scheme. For this reason, we state all our upper bounds for BA and state all our lower bounds for Byzantine Broadcast -this makes our upper-and lower-bounds both stronger.
Additional related works. A line of works in the literature [10, 16, 20] have focused on a simulation-based notion of adaptive security for Byzantine Broadcast, where the concern is that the adversary should not be able to observe what the sender wants to broadcast, and then adaptively corrupt the sender to flip the bit. This notion is stronger than what we consider specifically in the case of Byzantine Broadcast, but such a strong notion was only achieved earlier by making stronger assumptions than in our paper [16] , i.e., the "atomic message" model: after adaptively corrupting a node i, the adversary not only is unable to erase a message i already sent in this round, but also must wait for at least one maximum network delay before the corrupt i can start sending corrupt messages.
Lower Bound on Communication Against a Strongly Adaptive Adversary
In this section, we prove that any (possibly randomized) BA protocol must in expectation incur at least Ω(f 2 ) communication in the presence of a strongly adaptive adversary capable of performing after-the-fact removal. For the reasons mentioned in Section 1.1, we prove our lower bound for Byzantine Broadcast (which immediately applies to BA). Our proof strategy builds on and extends the classic Dolev and Reischuk [12, Theorem 2] lower bound, which shows that in every deterministic Byzantine Broadcast protocol honest nodes need to send at least Ω(f 2 ) messages.
Warmup: the Dolev-Reischuk lower bound. We first explain the Dolev-Reischuk proof at a high level. Observe that for a deterministic protocol, an execution is completely determined by the input (of the designated sender) and the adversary's strategy. Consider the following adversary A: A corrupts a set V of f /2 nodes that does not include the designated sender. Let U denote the set of remaining nodes. All parties in V behave like honest nodes, except that (i) they ignore the first f /2 messages sent to them, and (ii) they do not send messages to each other. Suppose the honest designated sender has input 0. For validity to hold, all honest nodes must output 0.
If at most (f /2) 2 messages are sent to V in the above execution, then there exists a node p ∈ V such that p receives at most f /2 messages. Let S(p) denote the set of nodes that send messages to p. Clearly, |S(p)| ≤ f /2. We define another adversary A ′ almost identically as A except that: (i) A ′ does not corrupt p, (ii) A ′ corrupts all nodes in S(p) (possibly including the designated sender), prevents them from sending any messages to p, but behave honestly to other nodes. Since |S(p)| ≤ f /2, A ′ corrupts at most f nodes.
Observe that honest nodes in U \S(p) receive identical messages from all other nodes in the two executions. Thus, U \S(p) would still output 0 under A ′ . However, p does not receive any message but has to output some value. If this value is 1, consistency is violated. If p outputs 0 when receiving no messages, we can let the sender send 1 under A and derive a consistency violation under A ′ following a symmetric argument.
Our lower bound. We now extend the above proof to randomized protocols. In a randomized protocol, there are two sources of randomness that need to be considered carefully. On one hand, honest nodes can use randomization to their advantage. On the other hand, an adaptive adversary can also leverage randomness. Indeed our lower bound uses a randomized adversarial strategy. In addition, our lower bound crucially relies on the adversary being strongly adaptive -the adversary can observe that a message is sent by an honest node h to any other party in a given round r, decide to adaptively corrupt h, and then remove messages sent by h in round r. We prove the following theorem -here we say that a protocol solves Byzantine Broadcast with probability q iff for any non-uniform p.p.t. strongly adaptive adversary, with probability q, every honest node outputs a bit at the end of the protocol, and moreover, consistency and validity are satisfied. Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that a protocol solves Byzantine Broadcast against a strongly adaptive adversary with less than ǫ probability of error using less than (ǫf /2) 2 expected messages.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol only violates safety and validity but never violates termination. If this is not the case, i.e., if honest nodes sometimes do not output after poly(n) rounds, we can simply make them output 1. The probability of error of the resulting new protocol is no larger by more than 1 poly(n) than that of the original one because we simply converted all instances of termination violations into safety or validity violations. Now, in an always-terminating protocol, without loss of generality, assume that there exist ⌈n/2⌉ nodes that output 1 with at least 1/2 probability if they receive no messages. (Otherwise, then there must exist ⌈n/2⌉ nodes that output 0 with at least 1/2 probability if they receive no messages, and the entire proof follows from a symmetric argument.) Let V be a set of f /2 such nodes not containing the designated sender. We can always find such a V because f /2 < ⌈n/2⌉. Let U denote the remaining nodes. In the rest of proof, let the designated sender send 0.
Next, consider the following adversary A (same as Dolev-Reischuk):
2. Each party in V behaves like an honest node, except that it ignores the first f /2 messages sent to it and does not send messages to other nodes in V .
For a protocol to have an expected message complexity of (ǫf /2) 2 , honest nodes collectively need to send fewer than that many messages in expectation regardless of the adversary's strategy. Let z be a random variable denoting the number of messages sent by honest nodes to V . We have
Let Y be the event that among the first ǫ(f /2) 2 messages, a node p picked uniformly at random by the adversary receives at most f /2 messages. Observe that among the first ǫ(f /2) 2 = ǫ|V |(f /2) messages, there exist at most ǫ|V | nodes that receive more than f /2 of those. Since p has been picked uniformly at random from V , Pr[Y ] ≥ 1 − ǫ. Thus we have that
Now, define another adversary A ′ almost identically as A except:
1. The adversary A ′ picks a node p ∈ V uniformly at random; it corrupts everyone else in V except p.
2. Whenever some node s ∈ U attempts to send a message to p in a round, if A ′ has corrupted fewer than f nodes so far, it immediately corrupts s and removes the message sent by s to p in that round. Once corrupted, s does not send p any messages but otherwise behaves correctly.
Observe that X ∩ Y denotes the event where the total number of messages sent by honest nodes to V is less than ǫ(f /2) 2 and among those p has received at most f /2 messages. Let S(p) be the set of nodes that attempt to send p messages (some or all of these attempts are blocked). Thus, we have shown that, Pr[S(p) ≤ f /2] ≥ 1 − 2ǫ. This is the probability that the random node p picked by the adversary A receives ≤ f /2 messages, which also means p receives no message at all under the adversary A ′ . Thus, p outputs 1 with at least 1/2 probability under A ′ by the definition of V . Meanwhile, honest nodes in U \S(p) receive identical messages under the two adversarial strategies A and A ′ , and they need to output 0 under A to preserve validity. Thus, with Pr[X ∩ Y ] > 
Synchronous BA with Subquadratic Communication Complexity
In this section, we present our synchronous BA protocol that achieves sublinear multicast complexity. For ease of exposition, in the main body we opt for simplicity: we explain a simple protocol that tolerates only 1 3 − ǫ fraction of adaptive corruptions, and completes in ω(log κ) rounds. In the appendices, we will show how to improve the resilience to 
Corruptions
We first describe an extremely simple, communication-inefficient synchronous BA protocol (inspired by the Phase-King paradigm [2] ) that tolerates less than 1 3 corruptions. For a synchronous network, multicast by honest nodes will be received by honest nodes at the beginning of the next round.
The protocol proceeds in epochs r = 0, 1, . . . R − 1 where R is a super-logarithmic function in κ, and every epoch consists of O(1) synchronous rounds. For the time being, assume a random leader election oracle that elects and announces a random leader at the beginning of every epoch. At initialization, every node i sets b i to its input bit, and sets its "sticky flag" F = 1 (think of the sticky flag as indicating whether to "stick" to the bit in the previous epoch). Each epoch r now proceeds as follows where all messages are signed, and only messages with valid signatures are processed: 1. The leader of epoch r (i.e., node r) flips a random coin b and multicasts (propose, r, b). Basically, in every epoch, every node either switches to the leader's proposal (if any has been observed) or it sticks to its previous "belief" b i . This simple protocol works because of the following observations. Henceforth, we refer to a collection of at least • Consistency within an epoch. Suppose that in epoch r, honest node i observes ample ACKs for b from a set of nodes denoted S, and honest node j observes ample ACKs for b ′ from the set S ′ . By a standard quorum intersection argument, S ∩ S ′ must contain at least one forever-honest node. Since honest nodes vote uniquely, it must be that b = b ′ .
• A good epoch exists. Next, suppose that in some epoch r the leader is honest. We say that this leader chooses a lucky bit b * iff either 1) in epoch r − 1, no honest nodes have seen ample ACKs for either bit and thus all honest nodes will switch to the leader's proposal in epoch r; or 2) in epoch r−1, some honest nodes have seen ample ACKs for a unique bit b * (which agrees with the current leader's random choice). Clearly, an honest leader chooses a lucky b * with probability at least 1/2; and except with exp(Ω(−R)) probability, an honest-leader epoch with a lucky choice must exist.
• Persistence of honest choice after a good epoch. Now, as soon as we reach an epoch (denoted r) with an honest leader and its choice of bit b * is lucky, then all honest nodes will ACK b * in epoch r. Thus all honest nodes will hear ample ACKs for b * in epoch r; therefore, they will all stick to ACKing b * in epoch r + 1. By induction, in all future epochs they will stick to ACKing b * .
• Validity. If all honest nodes receive the same bit b * as input then due to the same argument as above the bit b * will always stick around in all epochs.
Communication Efficiency through Vote-Specific Eligibility
The above simple protocol requires in expectation linear number of multicast messages (in each round every node multicasts a message). We now consider how to improve the multicast complexity of the warmup protocol and we will remove the idealized leader election oracle in the process too.
Background on VRFs. We rely on a verifiable random function (VRF) [26] . A trusted setup phase is used to generate a public-key infrastructure (PKI): each node i ∈ [n] obtains a VRF secret key sk i , and its corresponding public key pk i . Recall that a VRF evaluation on the message µ denoted (ρ, π) ← VRF sk i (µ) generates a pseudorandom value ρ and a proof π such that ρ is computationally indistinguishable from random without the secret key sk i , and with pk i everyone can verify from the proof π that ρ is evaluated correctly.
Strawman: the Chen-Micali approach. We first describe the paradigm of Chen and Micali [9] but we explain it in the context of our warmup protocol. Imagine that now not everyone is required to vote in a round r. Instead, we use the function VRF 1 sk i (ACK, r) < D to determine whether i is eligible to vote in round r where VRF 1 denote the first output of the VRF, and D is a difficulty parameter appropriately chosen such that in expectation, λ := ω(log κ) many nodes would be chosen to vote in each round. When node i sends an ACK message, it attaches the VRF's evaluation outcome as well as the proof such that every node can verify its eligibility using its public key pk i . Correspondingly, when we tally votes, the original threshold 2n/3 should be changed to 2λ/3, i.e, super-majority of the expected committee size. Evaluating the VRF requires knowing the node's secret key. Thus, only the player itself knows at what rounds it is eligible to vote. This may seem to solve the problem because the adversary cannot predict in advance who will be sending messages in every round The problem with this is that once an adaptive adversary A notices that some player i was eligible to vote for b in round r (because i just sent a valid vote for b), A can corrupt i immediately and make i vote for 1 − b in the same round!
To tackle this precise issue, Chen and Micali [9] relies on the memory-erasure model (referred to as ephemeral keys in their paper): the players employ a forward-secure signing scheme 5 , and erase its roundspecific secret-key immediately after casting the vote, such that even if the attacker instantly corrupts this node, it cannot cast another vote in the same round.
Our key insight: bit-specific eligibility. Our key insight is to make the eligibility bit-specific. To elaborate, the committee eligible to vote for b in round r is chosen independently from the committee eligible to vote on 1 − b in the same round. Concretely, node i is eligible to send an ACK message for the bit b ∈ {0, 1} in round r iff VRF
where D is the aforementioned difficulty parameter. What does this achieve? Suppose that the attacker sees some node i votes for the bit b in round r. Although the attacker can now immediately corrupt i, the fact that i was allowed to vote for b in round r does not make i any more likely to be eligible to vote for 1 − b in the same round. Thus, corrupting i is no more useful to the adversary than corrupting any other node.
Finally, since we already make use of the VRF, as a by-product we can remove the idealized leader election oracle in the warmup protocol: a node i is eligible for making a proposal in iteration r iff VRF 1 sk i (propose, r, b) < 5 Informally, in a forward secure signing scheme, in the beginning the node has a key that can sign any slot numbered 0 or higher; after signing a message for slot t, the node can update its key to one that can henceforth sign only slots t + 1 or higher, and the old key is erased. D 0 where D 0 is a separate difficult parameter explained below, and the node attaches the VRF evaluation outcome and proof with any proposal it makes so others can verify its eligibility.
Difficulty parameters. The two difficulty parameters D and D 0 need to be specified differently. Recall that D is used to elect a committee in each round for sending ACK messages; and D 0 is used for leader election.
1. D should be set such that each committee is λ = ω(log κ)-sized in expectation 6 ; whereas 2. D 0 should be set such that every proposal has a 1/2n probability to be eligible.
Putting it altogether. More formally, we use the phrase "node i conditionally multicasts a message (T, r, b)" to mean that node i checks if it is eligible to vote for b in epoch r and if so, it multicasts (T, r, b, i, π), where π is a proof proving that i indeed is eligible (π includes the pseudorandom evaluation result and the proof that is output by the VRF). Here T ∈ {propose, ACK} stands for the type of the message. Now, our new subset-sampling based protocol is almost identical to simple protocol with large multicast complexity except for the following changes:
• every occurrence of multicast is now replaced with "conditionally multicast";
• the threshold number of ACKs for a bit to stick is now replaced with 2λ 3 ; and • upon receiving every message, a node checks the proof to verify the message's validity (whereas in the earlier protocol nodes only checks signatures).
Subtleties in cryptographic reasoning and deferred technical details. Most previously known VRF constructions [4, 18, 26] do not provide security under an adaptive adversary 7 . Chen and Micali [9] use random oracles (RO) and unique signatures to construct an adaptively secure VRF but our goal is to remove the RO. In the appendices, we will show how to instantiate an appropriate VRF with adaptive security. The proof for this part is actually rather technical and subtle, but in the interest of space we have to defer it to the appendices.
Proof Sketch
We call an attempt for node i to check eligibility to send either a propose or ACK message a mining attempt for a propose or ACK message (inspired by Bitcoin's terminology where miners "mine" blocks).
We now explain why our new protocol works, by following similar arguments as the underlying BAbut now we must additionally analyze the stochastic process induced by eligibility election.
To help our analysis, we shall abstract away the cryptography needed for eligibility election, and instead think of eligibility election as making "mining" queries with a trusted party called F mine . Specifically, if a node i wants to check its eligibility for (T, r, b) where T ∈ {propose, ACK}, it calls F mine .mine(T, r, b), and F mine shall flip a random coin with appropriate probability to determine whether this "mining" attempt is successful. If successful, F mine .verify((T, r, b), i) can vouch to any node of the successful attempt (imagine that this is used in place of verifying the VRF proof). We now analyze this stochastic process.
• Consistency within an epoch. We first argue why "consistency within an epoch" still holds with the new scheme. Henceforth, if a node makes a mining attempt for some (T, r, b) while still being honest, this is called an honest mining attempt (even if the node immediately becomes corrupt afterwards in the same round). Else, if an already corrupt node makes a mining attempt, it is called a corrupt mining attempt.
There are at most ( 1 3 − ǫ)n corrupt nodes, each of which might try to mine for 2 ACKs (one for each bit) in some fixed epoch r. On the other hand, each so-far-honest node will try to mine for only 1 ACK in each epoch. Therefore, in epoch r, the total number of (honest or corrupt) mining attempts is at most ( Remark. It is important that the eligibility election be tied to the bit being proposed/ACKed. Had it not been the case, the adversary could observe whenever an honest node sends (ACK, r, b), and immediately corrupt the node in the same round and make it send (ACK, r, 1 − b) too. In this case, clearly if there are 2λ 3 ACKs for b in epoch r, then by corrupting all these nodes that sent the ACKs, the adversary can construct 2λ 3 ACKs for 1 − b, and thus "consistency within an epoch" does not hold.
• A good epoch exists. We now argue why "a good epoch exists" in our new scheme. Here, for an epoch r to be good, the following must hold: 1) a single so-far-honest node successfully mines a propose message, and no already corrupt node successfully mines a propose message 8 ; and 2) if some honest nodes want to stick to a (unique) belief b * in epoch r, the leader's random coin must agree with b * . Note that every so-far-honest node makes only one propose mining attempt per epoch. Every already corrupt node can make two propose mining attempts in an epoch, one for each bit. Regardless, recall that our propose mining difficulty parameter is set such that on average one node is elected leader every 2 epochs (in an honest execution) -this implies that in every epoch, with Θ(1) probability, a single honest propose mining attempt is successful and no corrupt propose mining attempt is successful. Since our protocol consists of λ = ω(log κ) epochs, a good epoch exists except with negligible in κ probability.
• Persistence of honest choice after a good epoch and validity. Finally, the remainder of the proof, including "persistence of honest choice after a good epoch" and "validity" hold in a relatively straightforward fashion by applying the standard Chernoff bound.
On The Neccessity of Setup Assumptions: Informal Overview
We show that some form of setup assumption is needed for multicast-based subquadratic BA. Specifically, in the plain authenticated channels model without any setup assumptions, we show the impossibility of sublinear multicast-complexity BA. Our proof is inspired by the classical techniques for proving consensus lower bounds in the authenticated channels model [15, 24, 25] ; however, we extend known techniques in novel and non-trivial manners, particularly in the way we rely on the ability to make adaptive corruptions to complete the proof. We provide an informal overview of our lower bound proof below (for Theorem 3) while deferring the formal description to Appendix B. As mentioned in Section 1.1, we consider Byzantine Broadcast in proving our lower bound which makes our lower bound stronger (and immediately implies the same lower bound for BA). Suppose that some protocol achieves adaptive security and sublinear multicast complexity. We describe a hypothetical experiment: consider two honest executions that share a single node (that is not the designated sender): (input: 0) Q ---1 ---Q' (input: 1). The set Q contains nodes numbered 2, . . . , n, and so does the set Q ′ . The node 1 is shared across the two executions. Whenever a node in Q (or Q ′ resp.) sends a message, all nodes in Q (or Q ′ resp.) and the node 1 receives the message. Whenever 1 wants to send a message, it sends it to nodes in both Q and Q ′ . If 1 receives a message from either i ∈ Q or i ∈ Q ′ , it acts as if the message is received from i. We assume that 2 ∈ Q and 2 ∈ Q ′ are the senders respectively in the two executions, and that they receive the inputs 0 and 1 respectively.
We now interpret this hypothetical experiment in two ways. First, it could be that 1 is the malicious node simulating all of Q ′ and Q is honest. Alternatively, it could be that there are only nodes 1 to n, initially all honest, and the nodes in Q ′ are imaginary and entirely simulated by the adversary in its head. Whenever some node in Q ′ wants to speak, the corresponding one in Q is adaptively corrupt to implement this action -it is not difficult to see that the adversary needs to corrupt only sublinear number of nodes. By the validity requirement in the former interpretation (where 1 is corrupt), we conclude that nodes in Q must output 0 and nodes in Q ′ must output 1 by symmetry. Now, consider the latter interpretation (where 1 is honest), we may conclude that the node 1 must be consistent with nodes in Q; and by symmetry 1 must be consistent with nodes in Q ′ too. This allows us to reach a contradiction and rule out the existence of such a protocol.
We stress that it is important that we use only the consistency property in reasoning for the latter interpretation since the sender may be corrupt in the latter interpretation. The formal proof will be presented in Appendix B.
Summary of Deferred Materials in Appendices
We give an overview of the additional results and formal proofs contained in the appendices.
1. We show how to improve the resilience of our synchronous protocol to tolerate (nearly) minority corruptions and formal proofs in Appendix C.
2. For ease of exposition, in our appendices we first describe our protocols assuming an F mine ideal functionality. We formally describe how to remove this ideal oracle using appropriate, adaptively secure cryptographic building blocks in Appendix D, and present the computational reduction proofs in Appendix E.
3. We formally present a detailed proof for Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
[ [28] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 2008.
A Preliminaries

A.1 Model of Protocol Execution
We assume a standard protocol execution model with n parties (also called nodes) numbered 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. An external party called the environment and denoted Z provides inputs to honest nodes and receives outputs from the honest nodes. An adversary denoted A can adaptively corrupt nodes any time during the execution. All nodes that have been corrupt are under the control of A, i.e., the messages they receive are forwarded to A, and A controls what messages they will send once they become corrupt. The adversary A and the environment Z are allowed to freely exchange messages any time during the execution. Henceforth, at any time in the protocol, nodes that remain honest so far are referred to as so-far-honest nodes; nodes that remain honest till the end of the protocol are referred to as forever-honest nodes; nodes that become corrupt before the end of the protocol are referred to as eventually-corrupt nodes. Henceforth, we assume that all parties as well as A and Z are Interactive Turing Machines, and the execution is parametrized by a security parameter κ that is common knowledge to all parties as well as A and Z.
Communication model. We assume that the execution proceeds in rounds. We assume a synchronous network, i.e., every message sent by an so-far-honest node is guaranteed to be received by an honest recipient at the beginning of the next round. All of our protocols will be in the multicast model: honest nodes participate in the protocol by multicasting messages to each other. We assume that when a so-far-honest node i multicasts a message M , it can immediately become corrupt in the same round and made to send one or more messages in the same round. However, the message M that was already multicast before i became corrupt cannot be retracted -in a synchronous model, all other so-far-honest nodes will receive the message M at the beginning of the next round.
Notational conventions. Since all parties, including the adversary A and the environment Z are assumed to be non-uniform probabilitic polynomial-time (p.p.t.) Interactive Turing Machines (ITMs), protocol execution is assumed to be probabilistic in nature. We would like to ensure that certain security properties such as consistency and liveness hold for almost all execution traces, assuming that both A and Z are polynomially bounded.
Henceforth in the paper, we use the notation view ← EXEC Π (A, Z, κ) to denote a sample of the randomized execution of the protocol Π with A and Z, and security parameter κ ∈ N. The randomness in the experiment comes from honest nodes' randomness, A, and Z, and view is sometimes also referred to as an execution trace or a sample path. We would like that the fraction of sample paths that fail to satisfy relevant security properties be negligibly small in the security parameter κ.
More formally, let P be a polynomial-time computable predicate defined over a view that checks whether certain security properties hold for a view. Whenever we say "except for a negligible fraction of the views, P (view) = 1" or "except with negligible probability over the choice of view, P (view) = 1", we technically mean the following:
For any p.p.t. (A, Z) (possibly required to respect a certain corruption budget), there exists a negligible function negl(·), such that
In particular, a function negl(·) is said to be negligible if for every polynomial p(·), there exists some κ 0 such that negl(κ) ≤ 1 p(κ) for every κ ≥ κ 0 . Definition 5 ((n, α)-respecting). We say that (A, Z) is (n, α)-respecting with respect to some protocol Π iff for every view in the support of EXEC Π (A, Z, κ), (A, Z) spawns n nodes among which at most α fraction can be adaptively corrupt.
Multicast complexity. We now formally define the notion of classical communication complexity and multicast complexity.
Definition 6 (Classical communication complexity).
Suppose that Π is a protocol expressed in the pairwisechannels model. We say that Π has communication complexity C(κ, n) w.r.t. (A, Z), iff except with negligible probability over the choice of view sampled from EXEC Π (A, Z, κ), the total number of bits exchanged by pairs of honest nodes is bounded by C(κ, n).
Definition 7 (Multicast complexity). Suppose that Π is a protocol in the multicast model. We say that Π has multicast complexity C(κ, n) w.r.t. (A, Z), iff except with negligible probability over the choice of view sampled from EXEC Π (A, Z, κ), the total number of bits multicast by honest nodes is bounded by C(κ, n).
A.2 Formal Definitions for Byzantine Agreement
We formally define two versions of the problem, a broadcast version where only a designated sender has an input; and an agreement version where all nodes have input.
A.2.1 Broadcast Version
In a Byzantine broadcast protocol, there is a designated sender (or simply sender) that is part of the common knowledge. We use the convention that node 0 is the sender.
Syntax. Prior to protocol start, the sender receives an input b ∈ {0, 1} from the environment Z. At the end of the protocol, every node i (including the sender) outputs a bit b i to the environment Z.
Security definition. A Byzantine broadcast protocol Π must satisfy consistency, validity, and T end -termination. Specifically, let T end := poly(κ, n) be a polynomial in κ and n, we say that the protocol Π satisfies consistency, validity, and T end -termination with respect to (A, Z) iff there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for every κ, except with negl(κ) probability over the choice of view← $ EXEC Π (A, Z, κ), the following properties hold:
• Consistency. If a forever-honest node outputs b i and another forever-honest node outputs b j to Z, then it must hold that b i = b j .
• Validity. If the sender is forever-honest and the sender's input is b from Z, then all forever-honest nodes must output b to Z.
• T end -termination. By the end of round T end (κ, n), all forever-honest nodes output a bit.
We say that a Byzantine broadcast Π satisfies consistency, validity, and T end -termination in (n, α)-environments, iff for every p.p.t. (A, Z) that is (n, α)-respecting with respect to Π, Π satisfies consistency, validity, or T end -termination with respect to (A, Z).
A.2.2 Agreement Version
An agreement protocol 9 does not have a designated sender. Intead, every honest node receives an input bit from the environment Z. Validity is required only if all honest nodes receive the same input bit b -in this case, honest nodes' ouput is required to match this bit. We provide formal definitions below.
Syntax. Prior to protocol start, every node i receives an input b i ∈ {0, 1} from the environment Z. At the end of the protocol, every node i (including the sender) outputs a bit b ′ i to the environment Z. Security definition. An agreement protocol Π must satisfy consistency, validity, and T end -termination. Specifically, let T end := poly(κ, n) be a polynomial in κ and n, we say that the protocol Π satisfies consistency, validity, and T end -termination with respect to (A, Z) iff there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for every κ, except with negl(κ) probability over the choice of view← $ EXEC Π (A, Z, κ), the following properties hold:
• Validity. If all forever-honest nodes receive the same input bit b from Z, then all forever-honest nodes must output b to Z.
We say that an agreement protocol Π satisfies consistency, validity, and T end -termination in (n, α)-environments, iff for every p.p.t. (A, Z) that is (n, α)-respecting with respect to Π, Π satisfies consistency, validity, or T end -termination with respect to (A, Z).
A.3 Ideal Mining Functionality F mine
Earlier in Section 3.2, we described how to leverage cryptographic building blocks such as PRFs and NIZKs to realize committee/leader election (or eligibility election). For all our protocols, it would be convenient to describe them assuming such eligibility election is a blackbox primitive. We thus introduce an ideal functionality called F mine which, informally speaking, captures the cryptographic procedures of random eligibility selection. One can imagine that F mine is a trusted party such that whenever a node attempts to mine a ticket for a message type m, F mine flips a random coin with an appropriate probability to decide if this mining attempt is successful. F mine stores the results of all previous coin flips, such that if a node performs another mining attempt for the same m later, the same result will be used.
Henceforth in our paper, we will first describe all of our protocols in an ideal world assuming the existence of such a trusted party F mine (also referred to as F mine -hybrid protocols in the cryptography literature [5, 6] ). Later in Appendix D, we will show that using the cryptographic techniques described in Section 3.2, all of our F mine -hybrid protocols can be instantiated in a real world where F mine does not exist. F mine ideal functionality. As shown in Figure 1 , the F mine ideal functionality has two activation points:
• Whenever a node i calls mine(m) for the first time, F mine flips a random coin to decide if node i has successfully mined a ticket for m.
• If node i has called mine(m) and the attempt is successful, anyone can then call verify(m, i) to ascertain that indeed i has mined a ticket for m.
This F mine functionality is secret since if an so-far-honest node i has not attempted to mine a ticket for m, then no corrupt node can learn whether i is in the committee corresponding to m.
The function P : {0, 1} * → [0, 1] maps each message to some success probability.
• 
B Setup Assumptions are Necessary for Sublinear Multicast Complexity
In this section, we show that it is impossible to have an adaptively secure Byzantine agreement protocol that achieves o(n) multicast complexity under an authenticated channels model (i.e., without PKI) -even when 99% of the nodes must remain honest. Our lower bound holds even when assuming the existence of an RO and in the erasure model. As mentioned in Section 4, for our lower bound, we consider a broadcast variant of the BA problem. In the broadcast version of the problem, there is a designated sender who tries to send its input bit to all players. Consistency requires that (except with negligible probability) all honest nodes output the same bit; and validity requires that (except with negligible probability) if the sender is forever-honest, all honest nodes must output the sender's input bit. As we explained earlier in Section 4, considering the broadcast variant makes our lower bound stronger.
Model for our lower bound. We consider a model where any message multicast by an honest sender is delivered to all honest nodes at the beginning of the next round, i.e., ∆ = 1. Further, the message always carries the true identity of the sender, i.e., the communication channel authenticates the sender.
Proof of Theorem 3. We now prove the impossibility result, i.e., Theorem 3 whose statement was formally presented in the introduction.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a Byzantine broadcast protocol with C(κ, n) multicast complexity and tolerating C(κ, n) corruptions; and suppose that n = poly(κ) is a sufficiently large polynomial. We will prove the impossibility by considering a hypothetical experiment where a set of 2n − 1 nodes, connected in specific ways, execute the honest protocol. We argue that this hypothetical experiment can be interpreted in two different ways; and relying on the security properties of BA, we reach a contradiction by reasoning about the two interpretations.
A hypothetical experiment. Consider a hypothetical experiment depicted in the following graph:
More specifically, imagine that the node 1 simultaneously participates in two executions of the protocol: on the left the node 1 plays with the set Q, containing nodes numbered 2, 3, . . . , n; on the right, the node 1 plays with the set Q ′ , containing nodes also numbered 2, 3, . . . , n. Suppose that node 2 ∈ Q and node 2 ∈ Q ′ are the two senders; further 2 ∈ Q receives the input 0 and 2 ∈ Q ′ receives the input 1. All nodes in Q ∪ {1} ∪ Q ′ execute the honest protocol where messages are forwarded as below:
• whenever node 1 multicasts a message, the same message is delivered to nodes in both Q and Q ′ ;
• whenever any node i ∈ {2, . . . , n} from Q multicasts a message, it is delivered to all nodes in Q as well as the node 1;
• whenever any node i ∈ {2, . . . , n} from Q ′ multicasts a message, it is delivered to all nodes in Q ′ as well as the node 1.
Note that node 1 treats a message from i ∈ Q and i ∈ Q ′ identically, i.e., the message has the sender identity i for some i ∈ {2, . . . , n} no matter whether i comes from Q or Q ′ .
To summarize the above defines a hypothetical experiment containing 2n − 1 nodes all executing the honest protocol and where protocol messages are routed in specific ways. We now interpret this hypothetical experiment in two different manners, leading to a contradiction.
Corrupt-1 interpretation: First, the hypothetical experiment can be viewed as an execution among n nodes numbered 1, 2, . . . , n, where the node 1 is (statically) corrupt. Specifically, imagine that the set Q ′ represents the honest nodes numbered 2, 3, . . . , n; and imagine that the corrupt node 1 is simulating all nodes in Q in its head. In this case, by the definition of multicast complexity, we immediately conclude the following where we use the random variable view to denote a random sample of the hypothetical experiment:
Claim 8. Except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the hypothetical experiment, nodes in Q ′ cannot send more than C(κ, n) bits of distinct messages. By symmetry, we also have that except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the merged execution, nodes in Q cannot send more than C(κ, n) bits of distinct messages. Now, by the validity requirement of Byzantine broadcast, we have the following: Claim 9. Except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the hypothetical experiment, all nodes in Q ′ output 1. By symmetry, we also have that except with negligible probability over the choice of view of the merged execution, all nodes in Q output 0. Now, it is interesting to consider what node 1 should output in the hypothetical experiment. To answer this question, we can view the execution in a different light. In comparison with the earlier interpretation, here the important difference is that now we want to explain the execution assuming 1 is actually honest.
Honest-1 interpretation:
Only node 1 and nodes in Q are real and initially honest, and Q ′ is imaginary and simulated by the adversary in its head -initially, at protocol start, the adversary has not corrupted any node yet. It will make corruption actions along the way.
Note that the adversary can observe all messages sent over the authenticated channel. Based on the messages received, it simulates the actions of the imaginary nodes in Q ′ assuming that Q ′ follows the honest protocol. Whenever some node j ∈ Q ′ wants to speak, the adversary adaptively corrupts the corresponding node j ∈ Q and implements this action.
Specifically, at the end of each round, the adversary simulates the next round of all nodes in Q ′ in its head, and checks to see which nodes are about to send a message in the next round. The adversary then corrupts precisely those nodes that are about to send a message (unless they are already corrupt). As a special case, for the first round of the protocol, the adversary simulates the actions of Q ′ in its head prior to protocol start and corrupts those that are about to send a message in the first round. Now, say that at the beginning of some round r, some subset S ⊆ Q ′ are about to send a message, and recall that by the attack defined above, S has been corrupt by the adversary in Q. At this moment, the corrupt nodes S splits themselves into two threads: one thread still follows the honest protocol and sends whatever message the honest protocol instructs them to send; and the other thread sends whatever message its simulated copy in Q ′ ought to send in this round -but only to node 1 and not to anyone else.
Since the protocol has C(κ, n) multicast complexity, except with negligible probability over the choice of view, the adversary will corrupt no more than C(κ, n) nodes. Due to Claim 9, the remaining honest nodes in Q would output 0 except with negligible probability over the choice of view. By the consistency requirement of Byzantine broadcast 10 , except with negligible probability over the choice of view, node 1 should agree with the remaining honest nodes in Q, i.e., output 0 too.
By symmetry, it could be that the adversary is actually simulating Q and corrupting the corresponding nodes in Q ′ when nodes in Q want to speak. Due to Claim 9 and the consistency requirement, we conclude that except with negligible probability over the choice of view, node 1 should output 1 (to be consistent with the honest nodes in Q ′ . Thus we have a contradiction.
C Synchronous BA with Subquadratic Communication Complexity
In this section, we present our synchronous BA protocol that achieves subquadratic communication complexity -specifically our protocol is multicast-based and completes in sublinear number of multicast messages. Our starting point is Abraham et al. [1] , a synchronous BA protocol, tolerating f < n/2 corruptions, achieving expected constant round and quadratic communication complexity. We first explain Abraham et al. at a high level and then present techniques to achieve subquadratic communication complexity.
C.1 Warmup: Synchronous Quadratic BA
Our description below assumes n = 2f +1 nodes in total. The protocol runs in iterations r = 1, 2, · · · . Each iteration has four synchronous rounds called Status, Propose, Vote, and Commit, respectively. Messages sent at the beginning of a round will be received before next round. All messages are signed. Henceforth, a collection of f + 1 (signed) iteration-r Vote messages for the same bit b ∈ {0, 1} from distinct nodes is said to be an iteration-r certificate for b. For the time being, assume a random leader election oracle that elects a random leader L r at the beginning of every iteration r.
Below is the protocol for an iteration r ≥ 2. The protocol for the very first iteration r = 1 skips the Status and Propose rounds.
1. Status. Every node multicasts a Status message of the form (Status, r, b, C) containing the highest certified bit b it has seen so far as well as the corresponding certificate C.
2.
Propose. The leader L r chooses a bit b with the highest certificate denoted C breaking ties arbitrarily.
To unify the presentation, we say that a bit b without any certificate has an iteration-0 certificate and it is treated as the lowest ranked certificate. Suppose that the highest certificate C is from iteration r ′ . The leader multicasts (Propose, r, b) with C attached.
3. Vote. For the very first iteration r = 1, a node votes for its input bit b by multicasting (Vote, r = 1, b).
For all iterations r > 1, if a validly signed (Propose, r, b) message has been received from L r with a certificate C for b, and moreover if the node has not observed a strictly higher certificate for 1 − b, it multicasts an iteration-r Vote message for b of the form (Vote, r, b) with the leader's proposal attached 11 . Importantly, if the node has observed a certificate for the opposite bit 1 − b from the same iteration as C, it will vote for b.
4.
Commit. If a node has received f + 1 iteration-r signed votes for the same bit b from distinct nodes (which form an iteration-r certificate C for b) and no iteration-r vote for 1 − b, it multicasts an iteration-r Commit message for b of the form (Commit, r, b) with C attached.
⋆ (This step is not part of the iteration and can be executed at any time.) If a node has received f + 1 Commit messages for the same b from the same iteration from distinct nodes, it multicasts a termination message of the form (Terminate, b) with the f + 1 Commit messages attached. The node then outputs b and terminates. This last message will make all other nodes multicast Terminate, output b and terminate in the next round.
Consistency. To argue consistency, we show that if any honest node outputs a bit b in iteration r, then no certificate for 1 − b can be formed in iteration r and all subsequent iterations, assuming ideal signatures.
An honest node outputs b in iteration r, only if it has observed f + 1 iteration-r Commit messages (from distinct nodes) for b. One of these must have been sent by an honest node henceforth indexed by i * . For an iteration-r certificate for 1 − b to exist, an honest node must have multicast a vote for 1 − b. But in that case, i * would have received this conflicting vote and thus would not have sent the commit message for b. We have reached a contradiction. Thus, we can rule out any iteration-r certificate for 1 − b.
Furthermore, by the end of iteration r, all nodes will receive from node i * an iteration-r certificate for b. The preference for a higher certificate then ensures consistency for all subsequent iterations. Since no iteration-r certificate for 1 − b exists, no honest node votes for 1 − b in iteration r + 1; hence, no iteration-(r + 1) certificate for 1 − b can come into existence; hence no honest node votes for 1 − b in iteration r + 2 ...... A simple induction completes the proof.
Validity. Recall that the very iteration skips Status and Propose and directly starts with Vote. If all honest nodes have the same input bit b, then they all vote for b in the first iteration. By the end of the first iteration, every honest node has an iteration-1 certificate for b and no iteration-1 certificate for 1 − b exists. Validity then follows from consistency.
Expected constant round.
Once an iteration has an honest leader, it will sign a unique proposal for the bit b with the highest certificate reported by honest nodes. Then, all honest nodes send Vote and Commit messages for b, output and terminate in that iteration. Since leaders are selected at random, in expectation, an honest leader emerges in two iterations.
C.2 Synchronous Subquadratic BA through Vote-Specific Eligibility
The above simple protocol requires in expectation quadratic communication (in each round every node multicasts a message). We now improve the complexity of the warmup protocol to subquadratic and we will remove the idealized leader election oracle in the process too.
We now use the vote-specific eligibility to determine for each iteration, who is eligible for sending Status Propose, Vote and Commit messages for 0 and 1 respectively. To keep the presentation simple, we abstract away the cryptographic primitives for eligibility election and model it as an ideal functionality F mine . Henceforth, we call an attempt for node i to check eligibility to send a message a mining attempt. This is inspired by Bitcoin's terminology where miners "mine" blocks.
Concretely, node i is eligible to send a (T, r, b) where T is Status, Vote, or Commit, iff D and D 0 are appropriate difficulty parameters such each Status/Vote/Commit/Terminate multicast has a λ/n = ω(log κ)/n probability to be eligible and each leader proposal has a 1/2n probability to be eligible. We may assume n > λ; otherwise, if n is small, one should simply use the quadratic protocol.
We use the phrase "node i conditionally multicasts a message" to mean that node i checks with F mine if it is eligible to send that message and only multicasts the message if it is. Now, the subquadratic protocol is almost identical to the warmup protocol except for the following changes:
• every occurrence of f + 1 Vote, Commit, or Terminate messages is now replaced with λ/2 messages of that type;
• upon receiving every message of the form (i, m) including messages attached with other messages, a node invokes F mine .verify(i, m) to verify message's validity. Note that m can be of the form (T, r, b) where T ∈ {Status, Vote, Commit, Terminate} or of the form (Terminate, b).
C.3 Proof
We prove our new protocol works in this subsection. The proofs mostly follow the sketch in Section C.1 -except that we now need to analyze the stochastic process induced by eligibility. Our stochastic analysis here is performed assuming an idealized F mine , and this idealized oracle will be removed later in Section D.
Recall that n > λ. Throughout the proofs, we will also assume that the adversary makes at most (1/2 − ǫ)n adaptive corruptions where 0 < ǫ < 1/2 is a constant -in this case, the term exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) · poly(κ) would be negligibly small in κ. In particular, Lemma 10 and 11 below show that each bad event we care about happens with exp(−Ω(λ)) probability. We will then show there are at most poly(κ) such bad events that we need to take a union bound over.
Lemma 10. Except for exp(−Ω(ǫλ)) probability, if ǫn/2 honest nodes have terminated, all honest nodes terminate in the next round.
Proof. Each of those ǫn/2 nodes has a λ/n probability to be eligible to send Terminate. The probability that none of them is eligible is (1 − λ/n) ǫn/2 < exp(−ǫλ/2). Note that the adversary can fully control in what order honest nodes terminate, but it cannot predict which honest nodes are eligible to send Terminate. Thus, it cannot bias the above probability. Except for this exponentially small probability, a Terminate message sent by an honest eligible node makes all honest nodes terminate in the next round. 
Lemma 12. Except for exp(−Ω(λ)) probability, in any consecutive λ iterations, a good iteration exists in which there is a unique so-far-honest leader and no corrupted node is elected leader.
Proof. In any fixed iteration r, there are 2n total attempts to propose (every node can attempt to propose 0 or 1). The probability that one and only one of these attempts succeeds is It is not hard to show (using derivatives) that the above expression decreases as n increases and is greater than 1/e. With at least 1/2 probability, this successful propose attempt comes from a so-far-honest node. Thus, every iteration independently has 1 2e probability to be a good iteration. The probability that none of consecutive λ iterations is good is (1 − Proof. An honest node outputs b in iteration r, only if it has observed λ/2 Commit messages for b. By Lemma 11, except for exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability, one of the Commit messages was sent by a so-far-honest node henceforth indexed by i * . Similarly, for an iteration-r certificate for 1−b to exist, except for exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability, a so-far-honest node has multicast a vote for 1 − b. But in that case, i * would have received this conflicting vote and thus, still being honest by then, would not have sent the Commit message for b. We have reached a contradiction. Thus, no iteration-r certificate for 1 − b exists except for exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability.
Furthermore, by the beginning of iteration r + 1, all so-far nodes will receive from node i * an iteration-r certificate for b. The lack of iteration-r certificate for 1 − b together with the preference to higher certificate ensures that no honest node will vote for 1 − b in iteration r + 1. To form a certificate for 1 − b in a subsequent iteration, all λ/2 votes have to come from already-corrupt nodes, which happens with exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability by Lemma 11.
Lemma 14 (Validity). Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability, if all honest nodes have the same input bit b, then all nodes will output b.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 11: in the first iteration, except for the said probability, there will be sufficient number of honest nodes to send (Vote, r = 1, b), and there will not be sufficient number of corrupt nodes to vote for 1 − b. Validity then follows from consistency.
Lemma 15 (Efficiency). Except for exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability, all honest nodes terminate in λ rounds, and honest nodes collectively send O(nλ 2 ) messages (i.e., O(λ 2 ) multicasts) where each message is at most O((log κ + log n)λ)
Proof. By Lemma 12, with at least 1 2e probability, a single so-far-honest node is elected leader in an iteration. After this honest leader multicasts a unique proposal, all honest nodes will output and terminate in three rounds, unless there are insufficient eligible honest nodes to send Vote or Commit messages. Each of the above bad event happens with exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability by Lemma 11. Thus, in each iteration, there is a 1 2e − exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) = Θ(1) probability that all nodes terminate. The round complexity claims thus follow in a straightforward fashion.
By Chernoff bound, except with exp(−Ω(ǫ 2 λ)) probability, in each iteration, at most 2λ honest nodes multicast messages. The communication complexity claim thus follows. 
D Instantiating F mine in the Real World
So far, all our protocols have assumed the existence of an F mine ideal functionality. In this section, we describe how to instantiate the protocols in the real world (where F mine does not exist) using cryptography. Technically we do not directly realize the ideal functionality F mine in the sense of Canetti [6] -instead, we describe a real-world protocol that preserves all the security properties of the F mine -hybrid protocols.
D.1 Preliminary: Adaptively Secure Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We use f (κ) ≈ g(κ) to mean that there exists a negligible function ν(κ) such that |f (κ) − g(κ)| < ν(κ).
A non-interactive proof system henceforth denoted nizk for an NP language L consists of the following algorithms.
• crs ← Gen(1 κ , L): Takes in a security parameter κ, a description of the language L, and generates a common reference string crs.
• π ← P(crs, stmt, w): Takes in crs, a statement stmt, a witness w such that (stmt, w) ∈ L, and produces a proof π.
• b ← V(crs, stmt, π): Takes in a crs, a statement stmt, and a proof π, and outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Perfect completeness. A non-interactive proof system is said to be perfectly complete, if an honest prover with a valid witness can always convince an honest verifier. More formally, for any (stmt, w) ∈ L, we have that
Non-erasure computational zero-knowledge. Non-erasure zero-knowledge requires that under a simulated CRS, there is a simulated prover that can produce proofs without needing the witness. Further, upon obtaining a valid witness to a statement a-posteriori, the simulated prover can explain the simulated NIZK with the correct witness. We say that a proof system (Gen, P, V) satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge iff there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Gen 0 , P 0 , Explain) such that
where Real(crs, stmt, w) runs the honest prover P(crs, stmt, w) with randomness r and obtains the proof π, it then outputs (π, r); Ideal(crs 0 , τ 0 , stmt, w) runs the simulated prover π ← P 0 (crs 0 , τ 0 , stmt, ρ) with randomness ρ and without a witness, and then runs r ← Explain(crs 0 , τ 0 , stmt, w, ρ) and outputs (π, r).
Perfect knowledge extration. We say that a proof system (Gen, P, V) satisfies perfect knowledge extraction, if there exists probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen 1 , Extr), such that for all (even unbounded) adversary A,
and moreover,
D.2 Adaptively Secure Non-Interactive Commitment Scheme
An adaptively secure non-interactive commitment scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• crs ← Gen(1 κ ): Takes in a security parameter κ, and generates a common reference string crs.
• C ← com(crs, v, ρ): Takes in crs, a value v, and a random string ρ, and outputs a committed value C.
• b ← ver(crs, C, v, ρ): Takes in a crs, a commitment C, a purported opening (v, ρ), and outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Computationally hiding under selective opening. We say that a commitment scheme (Gen, com, ver) is computationally hiding under selective opening, iff there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Gen 0 , com 0 , Explain) such that
where Real(crs, v) runs the honest algorithm com(crs, v, r) with randomness r and obtains the commitment C, it then outputs (C, r); Ideal(crs 0 , τ 0 , v) runs the simulated algorithm C ← comm 0 (crs 0 , τ 0 , ρ) with randomness ρ and without v, and then runs r ← Explain(crs 0 , τ 0 , v, ρ) and outputs (C, r).
Perfectly binding. A commitment scheme is said to be perfectly binding iff for every crs in the support of the honest CRS generation algorithm, there does not exist
Theorem 18 (Instantiation of our NIZK and commitment schemes [19] Proof. The existence of such a NIZK scheme was shown by Groth et al. [19] via a building block that they called homomorphic proof commitment scheme. This building block can also be used to achieve a commitment scheme with the desired properties.
D.3 NP Language Used in Our Construction
In our construction, we will use the following NP language L. A pair (stmt, w) ∈ L iff
• parse stmt := (ρ, c, crs comm , m), parse w := (sk, s);
• it must hold that c = comm(crs comm , sk, s), and PRF sk (m) = ρ.
D.4 Compiler from F mine -Hybrid Protocols to Real-World Protocols
Our real-world protocol will remove the F mine oracle by leveraging cryptographic building blocks including a pseudorandom function family, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies computational zero-knowledge and computational soundness, and a perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitment scheme. Earlier in Section 1, we have described the intuition behind our approach. Hence in this section we directly provide a formal description of how to compile our F mine -hybrid protocols into real-world protocols using cryptography. This compilation works for our previous F mine -hybrid protocol described in Section C. The high-level idea is to realize an adaptively secure VRF from adaptively secure PRFs and NIZKs:
• Trusted PKI setup. Upfront, a trusted party runs the CRS generation algorithms of the commitment and the NIZK scheme to obtain crs comm and crs nizk . It then chooses a secret PRF key for every node, where the i-th node has key sk i . It publishes (crs comm , crs nizk ) as the public parameters, and each node i's public key denoted pk i is computed as a commitment of sk i using a random string s i . The collection of all users' public keys is published to form the PKI, i.e., the mapping from each node i to its public key pk i is public information. Further, each node i is given the secret key (sk i , s i ).
• Instantiating F mine .mine. Recall that in the ideal-world protocol a node i calls F mine .mine(m) to mine a vote for a message m. Now, instead, the node i calls ρ := PRF sk i (m), and computes the NIZK proof
where s i the randomness used in committing sk i during the trusted setup. Intuitively, this zero-knowledge proof proves that the evaluation outcome ρ is correct w.r.t. the node's public key (which is a commitment of its secret key).
The mining attempt for m is considered successful if ρ < D p where D p is an appropriate difficulty parameter such that any random string of appropriate length is less than D p with probability p -recall that the parameter p is selected in a way that depends on the message m being "mined".
• New message format. Recall that earlier in our F mine -hybrid protocols, every message multicast by a so-far-honest node i must of one of the following forms:
-Mined messages of the form (m, i) where node i has successfully called F mine .mine(m); For example, in the synchronous honest majority protocol (Section C), m can be of the form (T, r, b) where T ∈ {Propose, Vote, Commit, Status}, r denotes an epoch number, and b ∈ {0, 1, ⊥}; or of the form (Terminate, b).
-Compound messages, i.e., a concatenation of the above types of messages.
For every mined message (m, i) that is either stand-alone or contained in a compound message, in the real-world protocol, we rewrite (m, i) as (m, i, ρ, π) where the terms ρ and π are defined in the most natural manner:
is part of a message that a so-far-honest node i wants to multicast, then the terms ρ and π are those generated by i in place of calling F mine .mine(m) in the real world (as explained above);
-Else, if (m, i) is part of a message that a so-far-honest node j = i wants to multicast, it must be that j has received a valid real-world tuple (m, i, ρ, π) where validity will be defined shortly, and thus ρ and π are simply the terms contained in this tuple.
• Instantiating F mine .verify. In the ideal world, a node would call F mine .verify to check the validity of mined messages upon receiving them (possibly contained in compound messages). In the real-world protocol, we perform the following instead: upon receiving the mined message (m, i, ρ, π) that is possibly contained in compound messages, a node can verify the message's validity by checking:
1. ρ < D p where p is an appropriate difficulty parameter that depends on the type of the mined message; and 2. π is indeed a valid NIZK for the statement formed by the tuple (ρ, pk i , crs comm , m). The tuple is discarded unless both checks pass.
D.5 Main Theorems for Real-World Protocols
After applying the above compiler to our F mine -hybrid protocols described in Appendix C. we obtain our real-world protocol In this section, we present our main theorem statements for these three settings. The proofs for these theorems can be derived by combining the proofs in Appendix C as well as those in the following section, i.e., Appendix E where will show that the relevant security properties are preserved in the real world as long as the cryptographic building blocks are secure. In theorem statement below, when we say that "assume that the cryptographic building blocks employed are secure", we formally mean that 1) the pseudorandom function family employed is secure; 2) the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge and perfect knowledge extraction; 3) the commitment scheme is computationally hiding under selective opening and perfectly binding; and 4) the signature scheme is secure (if relevant).
Theorem 19 (Synchronous network with honest majority). Let π honestmaj be the protocol obtained by applying the above compiler to the protocol in Section C, and assume that the cryptographic building blocks employed are secure. Then, for any arbitrarily small positive constant ǫ, any n ∈ N, π honestmaj satisfies consistency, validity, and poly log(κ)-termination in (n, Proof. The proof of this theorem can be obtained by combining the F mine -hybrid analysis in Appendix C as well as Appendix E where we show that the relevant security properties are preserved in by the real world protocol.
E Real World is as Secure as the F mine -Hybrid World E.1 Preliminary: PRF's Security Under Selective Opening Our proof will directly rely on the security of a PRF under selective opening attacks. We will prove that any secure PRF family is secure under selective opening with a polynomial loss in the security.
Pseudorandomness under selective opening. We consider a selective opening adversary that interacts with a challenger. The adversary can request to create new PRF instances, query existing instances with specified messages, selectively corrupt instances and obtain the secret keys of these instances, and finally, we would like to claim that for instances that have not been corrupt, the adversary is unable to distinguish the PRFs' evaluation outcomes on any future message from random values from an appropriate domain. More formally, we consider the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• A(1 κ ) can adaptively interact with C through the following queries:
-Create instance. The challenger C creates a new PRF instance by calling the honest Gen(1 κ ). Henceforth, the instance will be assigned an index that corresponds to the number of "create instance" queries made so far. The i-th instance's secret key will be denoted sk i .
-Evaluate. The adversary A specifies an index i that corresponds to an instance already created and a message m, and the challenger computes r ← PRF sk i (m) and returns r to A.
-Corrupt. The adversary A specifies an index i, and the challenger C returns sk i to A (if the i-th instance has been created).
-Challenge. The adversary A specifies an index i * that must have been created and a message m. If b = 0, the challenger returns a completely random string of appropriate length. If b = 1, the challenger computes r ← PRF sk i * (m) and returns r to the adversary.
We say that A is compliant iff with probability 1, the challenge tuple (i * , m) satisfies the following: 1) A does not make a corruption query on i * throughout the game; and 2) A does not make any evaluation query on the tuple (i * , m). Proof. Single-selective-challenge selective opening security. In the single-selective challenge version of the game, the adversary commits to a challenge identifier i * upfront during the security game, such that later, challenge queries can only be made for the committed index i * .
First, we can show that any secure PRF family would satisfy single-selective-challenge selective opening security. Suppose that there is an efficient adversary A that can break the single-selective-challenge selective opening security game for some PRF family. We construct a reduction R that leverages A to break the PRF's security. The reduction R interacts with a PRF challenger as well as A. R generates PRF keys for all instances other than i * and answers non-i * evaluation and corruption queries honestly. For i * , A's evaluation requests are forwarded to the PRF challenger.
We consider the following three hybrids:
1. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R answers A's challenge queries on i * with random answers;
2. The PRF challenger has a random function, and R answers A's challenge queries on i * by forwarding the PRF challenger's answers (or equivalently by relying with random answers); and 3. The PRF challenger has a real, randomly sampled PRF function from the corresponding family, and R answers A's challenge queries on i * by forwarding the PRF challenger's answers.
It is not difficult to see that A's view in hybrid 1 is identical to its view in the single-selective challenge selective opening security game when b = 0; its view in hybrid 3 is identical to its view in the singleselective challenge selective opening security game when b = 1. Due to the security of the PRF, it is not difficult to see that any adjacent pair of hybrids are indistinguishable.
Single-challenge selective opening security. In the single-challenge selective opening version of the game, the adversary can only make challenge queries for a single i * but it need not commit to i * upfront at the beginning of the security game. We now argue that any PRF that satisfies single-selective-challenge selective opening security must satisfy single-challenge selective opening security with a polynomial security loss. The proof of this is straightforward. Suppose that there is an efficient adversary A that can break the single-challenge selective opening security of some PRF family, we can then construct an efficient reduction R that breaks the singleselective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family. Basically the reduction R guesses at random upfront which index i * the adversary A will choose for challenge queries. R then forwards all of A's queries to the challenger of the single-selective-challenge selective opening security security game. If the guess later turns out to be wrong, the reduction simply aborts and outputs a random guess b ′ . Otherwise, it outputs the same output as A. Suppose that A creates q instances of PRFs then we can conclude that R guesses correctly with probability at least 1/q. Thus whatever advantage A has in breaking the singlechallenge selective opening security, R has an advantage that is 1/q fraction of A's advantage in breaking the single-selective-challenge selective opening security of the PRF family.
Selective opening security. Finally, we show that any PRF family that satisfies single-challenge selective opening security must also satisfy selective opening security (i.e., Definition 20) with a polynomial security loss. This proof can be completed through a standard hybrid argument in which we replace the challenge queries from real to random one index at a time (where replacement is performed for all queries of the i-th new index that appeared in some challenge query).
E.2 Definition of Polynomial-Time Checkable Stochastic Bad Events
In all of our F mine -hybrid protocols earlier, some stochastic bad events related to F mine 's random coins can lead to the breach of protocol security (i.e., consistency, validity, or termination) These stochastic bad events are of the form imprecisely speaking: either there are too few honest mining successes or there are too many corrupt mining successes. More formally, for the honest majority protocol, the stochastic bad events are stated in Lemmas 10, 11 and 12. For these stochastic bad events, there is a polynomial-time predicate henceforth denoted F , that takes in 1) all honest and corrupt mining attempts and the rounds in which the attempts are made (for a fixed view) and 2) F mine 's coins as a result of these mining attempts, and outputs 0 or 1, indicating whether the bad events are true for this specific view.
In our earlier F mine -world analyses (in Appendix C), although we have not pointed out this explicitly, but our proofs actually suggest that the stochastic bad events defined by F happen with small probability even when A and Z are computationally unbounded.
The majority of this section will focus on bounding the second category of failures, i.e., stochastic bad events defined by the polynomial-time predicate F (where F may be a different predicate for each protocol).
For simplicity, we shall call our F mine -hybrid protocol Π ideal -for the three different protocols, Π ideal is a different protocol; nonetheless, the same proofs hold for all three protocols.
E.3 Hybrid 1
Hybrid 1 is defined just like our earlier F mine -hybrid protocol but with the following modifications:
• F mine chooses random PRF keys for all nodes at the very beginning, and let sk i denote the PRF key chosen for the i-th node.
• Whenever a node i makes a mine(m) query, F mine determines the outcome of the coin flip as follows: compute ρ ← PRF sk i (m) and use ρ < D p as the coin.
• Whenever A adaptively corrupts a node i, F mine discloses sk i to A. Proof. Let f be the number of adaptive corruptions made by A. To prove this lemma we must go through a sequence of inner hybrids over the number of adaptive corruptions made by the adversary A.
Hybrid 1.f . Hybrid 1.f is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1 except the following modifications: Suppose that A makes the last corruption query in round t and for node i. Whenever the ideal functionality F mine in Hybrid 1 would have called PRF sk j (m) for any j that is honest-forever and in some round t ′ ≥ t, in Hybrid 1.f , we replace this call with a random string. Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the claim does not hold. We can then construct a PRF adversary A ′ that breaks pseudorandomness under selective opening with non-negligible probability. A ′ plays F mine when interacting with A. A ′ is also interacting with a PRF challenger. In the beginning, for every node, A ′ asks the PRF challenger to create a PRF instance for that node. Whenever F mine needs to evaluate a PRF, A ′ forwards the query to the PRF challenger. This continues until A makes the last corruption query, i.e., the f -th corruption query -suppose this last corruption query is made in round t and the node to corrupt is i. At this moment, A ′ discloses sk i to the adversary. However, whenever Hybrid 1 would have needed to compute PRF sk j (m) for any j that is honest-forever and in some round t ′ ≥ t, A ′ makes a challenge query to the PRF challenger for the j-th PRF instance and on the message queried. Notice that if the PRF challenger returned random answers to challenges, A's view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f . Otherwise, if the PRF challenger returned true answers to challenges, A's view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 1.f ′ . Hybrid 1.f ′ is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1.f except the following modification: whenever A makes the last corruption query -suppose that this query is to corrupt node i and happens in round t -the ideal functionality F mine does not disclose sk i to A. Proof. We observe the following: once the last corruption query is made in round t for node i, given that for any t ′ ≥ t, any honest-forever node's coins are completely random. Thus whether or not the adversary receives the last corruption key does not help it to cause the relevant bad events to occur. Specifically in this case, at the moment the last corruption query is made -without loss of generality assume that the adversary makes all possible corrupt mining attempts -then whether the polynomial-checkable bad events defined by F take place is fully determined by F mine 's random coins and independent of any further actions of the adversary at this point. Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the claim does not hold. We can then construct a PRF adversary A ′ that breaks pseudorandomness under selective opening with non-negligible probability. A ′ plays the F mine when interacting with A. A ′ is also interacting with a PRF challenger. In the beginning, for every node, A ′ asks the PRF challenger to create a PRF instance for that node. Whenever F mine needs to evaluate a PRF, A ′ forwards the query to the PRF challenger. This continues until A makes the last corruption query, i.e., the f -th corruption query -suppose this last corruption query is made in round t and the node to corrupt is i. At this moment, A ′ does not disclose sk i to the adversary and does not query the PRF challenger to corrupt i's secret key either. Furthermore, whenever Hybrid 1.f ′ would have called PRF sk i (m) in some round t ′ ≥ t, A now calls the PRF challenger for the i-th PRF instance and on the specified challenge message, it uses the answer from the PRF challenger to replace the PRF sk i (m) call. Notice that if the PRF challenger returned random answers to challenges, A's view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f ′′ . Otherwise, if the PRF challenger returned true answers to challenges, A's view in this interation would be identically distributed as Hybrid 1.f ′ .
We can extend the same argument continuing with the following sequence of hybrids such that we can replace more and more PRF evaluations at the end with random coins, and withhold more and more PRF secret keys from A upon adaptive corruption queries -and nonetheless the probability that the security properties get broken will not be affected too much.
E.4 Hybrid 2
Hybrid 2 is defined almost identically as Hybrid 1, except that now the following occurs:
• Upfront, F mine generates an honest CRS for the commitment scheme and the NIZK scheme and discloses the CRS to A.
• Upfront, F mine not only chooses secret keys for all nodes, but commits to the secret keys of these nodes, and reveals the commitments to A.
• Every time F mine receives a mine query from a so-far-honest node i and for the message m, it evaluates ρ ← PRF sk i (m) and compute a NIZK proof denoted π to vouch for ρ. Now, F mine returns ρ and π to A.
• Whenever a node i becomes corrupt, F mine reveals all secret randomness node i has used in commitments and NIZKs so far to A in addition to revealing its PRF secret key sk i . Proof. The proof is standard and proceeds in the following internal hybrid steps.
• Hybrid 2.A. Hybrid 2.A is the same as Hybrid 2 but with the following modifications. F mine calls simulated NIZK key generation instead of the real one, and for nodes that remain honest so-far, F mine simulate their NIZK proofs without needing the nodes' PRF secret keys. Whenever an honest node i becomes corrupt, F mine explains node i's simulated NIZKs using node i's real sk i and randomness used in its commitment, and supplies the explanations to A. Proof. Straightforward due to the non-erasure computational zero-knowledge property of the NIZK.
• Hybrid 2.B. Hybrid 2.B is almost identical to Hybrid 2.A but with the following modifications. F mine calls the simulated CRS generation for the commitment scheme. When generating public keys for nodes, it computes simulated commitments without using the nodes' real sk i 's. When a node i becomes corrupt, it will use the real sk i to compute an explanation for the earlier simulated commitment. Now this explanation is supplied to the NIZK's explain algorithm to explain the NIZK too. It then calls the simulated NIZK prover using ρ to simulate a NIZK proof and sends it to A. Whenever A wants to corrupt a node i, A ′ corrupts it with its F mine , obtains sk i , and then runs the Explain algorithms of the commitment and NIZK schemes and discloses the explanations to A. Clearly A's view in this protocol is identically distributed as in Hybrid 2.B. Moreover, if A succeedings in causing the bad events defined by F to happen, clearly A ′ will too.
E.5 Hybrid 3
Hybrid 3 is almost identical as Hybrid 2 except with the following modifications. Whenever an already corrupt node makes a mining query to F mine , it must supply a ρ and a NIZK proof π. F mine then verifies the NIZK proof π, and if verification passes, it uses ρ < D p as the result of the coin flip. Proof. We can replace the NIZK's CRS generation Gen with Gen 1 which generates a CRS that is identically distributed as the honest Gen, but additionally generates an extraction trapdoor denoted τ 1 . Now, upon receiving A's NIZK proof π, F mine performs extraction. The lemma follows by observing that due to the perfect knowledge extraction of the NIZK and the perfect binding property of the commitment scheme, it holds except with negligible probability that the extracted witness does not match the node's PRF secret key that F mine had chosen upfront.
In the lemma below, when we say that "assume that the cryptographic building blocks employed are secure", we formally mean that the pseudorandom function family employed is secure; the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies non-erasure computational zero-knowledge and perfect knowledge extraction; the commitment scheme is computationally hiding under selective opening and perfectly binding; and for the synchronous honest majority protocol, additionally assume that the signature scheme is secure.
Lemma 33. Assume the cryptographic building blocks employed are secure. Then, for any p.p.t. (A, Z) , there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for any κ ∈ N, relevant security properties (including consistency, validity, and termination) are preseved with all but negl(κ) probability in Hybrid 3.
Proof. As mentioned, only two types of bad events can possibly lead to breach of the relevant security properties: 1) signature failure; and 2) bad events defined by F . Thus the lemma follows in a straightforward fashion by taking a union bound over the two.
E.6 Real-World Execution
We now show that the real-world protocol is just as secure as Hybrid 3 -recall that the security properties we care about include consistency, validity, and termination. Proof. We construct the following A ′ :
• A ′ obtains CRSes for the NIZK and the commitment scheme from its F mine and forwards them to A. A ′ also forwards the PKI it learns from F mine to A.
• Whenever A corrupts some node, A ′ does the same with its F mine , and forwards whatever learned to A.
• Whenever A sends some message to an honest node, for any portion of the message that is a "mined message" of any type, let (m, ρ, π) denote this mined message -we assume that m contains the purported miner of this message denoted i.
-A ′ checks the validity of π and that ρ < D p for an appropriate choice of p depending on the message's type; ignore the message if the checks fail;
-if the purported sender i is an honest node and node i has not successfully mined m with F mine , record a forgery event and simply ignore this message. Otherwise, continue with the following steps.
-if the purported sender i is a corrupt node: A ′ issues a corresponding mining attempt to F mine on behalf of i with the corresponding ρ and π if no such mining attempt has been made before;
-Finally, A ′ forwards m to the destined honest on behalf of the corrupt sender.
• Whenever A ′ receives some message from an honest node (of Hybrid 3): for every portion of the message that is a "mined message" of any type, at this point A ′ must have heard from F mine the corresponding ρ, and π terms. A ′ augments the message with these terms and forwards the resulting message to A.
Note that conditioned on views (determined by all randomness of the execution) with no forgery event then either the relevant bad events occur both in Hybrid 2 and the real-world execution, or occur in neither. For views with forgery events, it is not difficult to see that if Hybrid 2 (on this view) does not incur the relevant bad events, then neither would the real-world execution (for this view).
Proof. Single-selective-challenge selective opening security. In the single-selective challenge version of the game, the adversary commits to a challenge identifier i * upfront during the security game, such that later, challenge queries can only be made for the committed index i * .
